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The rneaning of Moscow:
"Non-lethal" weapons
and international law
in the early 21st century
David P. Fidler
David P Fidler is Professor of Law and Harryl Ice Faculty Fellow, Indiana University School
of Law, Bloomington, USA.

Abstract
At the intersectionof new weapon technologies and internationalhumanitarian
law, so-called "non-lethal"weapons have become an area ofparticularinterest.
This article analyses the relationship between "non-lethal" weapons and
international law in the early 21st century by focusing on the most seminal
incident to date in the short history of the "non-lethal"weapons debate, the
use of an incapacitatingchemical to end a terroristattack on a Moscow theatre
in October 2002. This tragic incident has shown that rapid technological
change will continue to stress internationallaw on the development and use
of weaponry but in ways more politically charged, legally complicated and
ethically challenging than the application of internationalhumanitarianlaw
in the past.

Deciphering Moscow
In the past decade, one of the most interesting areas produced by the intersection of new weapon technologies and international humanitarian law (IHL)
involves so-called "non-lethal" weapons (NLWs). The technological, military,
political, legal and ethical aspects of "non-lethal" weapons have generated significant attention and controversy.' The growth in the size, complexity and
intensity of the debate shows that this development is more than a post-Cold
War fad. In reflecting on how the law has handled the emergence of technologies that proponents claim are different from "lethal" weapons, it is therefore
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appropriate to take stock of "non-lethal" weapons in relation to international
humanitarian law specifically and international law in general. This article
analyses the relationship between "non-lethal" weapons and international law
in the early twenty-first century by focusing on the most seminal incident
to date in the short history of the "non-lethal" weapon debate - the use of
an incapacitating chemical to end a terrorist attack on a Moscow theatre in
October 2002.
The emergence of weapon technologies is often defined by historical
moments when their use tangibly reveals policy, legal and ethical issues that
previously were abstract. The deployment of chemical weapons on World
War I battlefields still contributes to how people think about such weapons. Perceptions of biological weapons are likewise darkened by the horrors
of Japanese experimentation with them in China before and during World
War II. The atomic explosions that devastated Hiroshima and Nagasaki
in August 1945 continue to cast a pall over nuclear weapons. At the time
of writing this article, the most significant real-world event to affect the
NLW debate has been the use of an incapacitating chemical in Moscow in
2002. Although most relevant to the controversies surrounding "non-lethal"
chemical weapons, the Moscow incident has broader implications for the
relationship between NLW developments and the rules of international law
examined below.
The article begins by reviewing how the debate on NLWs and international law unfolded prior to the Moscow incident. That period found many people, including myself,23, analysing the development and use of various NLWs in
terms of existing international law, especially international law on arms control
and IHL. These efforts revealed disagreements between proponents and sceptics
as to international law's role in NLW development and use. In the absence of
concrete events, evidence or data, the dialogue between proponents and sceptics retained an abstract quality that featured more conceptual speculation than
empirical analysis. 4
The article then describes the Moscow theatre incident and how this
crisis transformed abstract features of the NLW debate into an actual life-anddeath event of far-reaching importance. One of the most important effects of

1

2
3
4
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The literature on NLWs is now voluminous. For one bibliography on NLWs compiled by the Air University
Library at Maxwell Air Force Base, see Non-Lethal Weapons, August 2004, at <http://www.au.af.milau/aull
bibs/soft/nonlethal.htm>. Bibliography updates on NLWs are provided in the periodic Bradford Non-Lethal
Weapons Research Project Reports, at <http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/nlw/research-reports/> (last visited 22
June 2005).
David P. Fidler, "The international legal implications of 'non-lethal' weapons", Michigan Journal of
InternationalLaw, Vol. 21, 1999, pp. 51-100.
David P. Fidler, '"Non-lethal' weapons and international law: Three perspectives on the future, Medicine,
Conflict and Survival, Vol. 17, 2001, pp. 194-206.
In 1999, I argued, for example, that "[g]iven the embryonic nature of 'non-letha weapons development and
integration into military forces and strategies, much of the international legal analysis unfolds in a vacuum
of precedent, which gives the analysis an abstract and, at times, speculative quality" Fidler, op. cit. (note 2),
p. 55.
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the Moscow incident was to focus attention on how the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC)5 regulated the use of incapacitating chemicals for law
enforcement purposes, and the article interprets this aspect of the CWC in
light of what happened in Moscow. Finally, the present and future relationship
between NLWs and international law is examined in light of the aftermath of
Moscow.

Before Moscow: The debate on NLWs and international law
The debate about the international legal implications of NLWs only developed
in the latter half of the 1990s in response to increased interest in such weapons among military forces around the world, and particularly in the United
States. Before then, international law had addressed weapons designed, or
claimed, to be less lethal than conventional weapons. Treaties on biological,
chemical, and conventional weapons regulated "non-lethal" capabilities. The
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) prohibited the development of "non-lethal" biological weapons, whether for anti-personnel or antimat6riel purposes. 6 The CWC banned the development and use of chemical
weapons, defined to include toxic chemicals that cause temporary incapacitation.' In addition, the CWC prohibited the use of riot control agents (RCAs)
as a method of warfare.' States added a protocol to the UN Conventional
Weapons Convention in 1995 outlawing the use of laser weapons designed to
cause permanent blindness.9
Although these examples are of international law regulating "non-lethal"
weapons capabilities, no discourse centred on such weapons existed in international law before the mid-1990s. Growth in military and, to a lesser extent, law
enforcemento interest in the latter half of the 1990s stimulated international
legal analysis specifically of NLWs as a new category of weapons. (See Table 1
for descriptions of technologies.) Experts responded to claims that this weaponry was different not only technologically but also ethically from weapons that
international law had long been trying to regulate through arms control treaties
and IHL.
Convention on the Prohibition ofthe Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons
and on their Destruction, 13 January 1993, UNTS, Vol. 1974, p. 317 (hereinafter CWC).
6 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, 10 April 1972, InternationalLegal Materials,
309
(hereinafter BWC).
Vol. 11, 1972, p.
7 Arts. 1.1 and 11.2, CWC.
8 Art. 1.5, CWC.
9 Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (Additional Protocol IV to the UN Convention on Prohibitions
or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively
Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects of 1980), 13 October 1995, UN Doc. CCW/CONFI/7, 12
October 1995.
10 NLWs were, of course, familiar to law enforcement agencies by the latter half of the 1990s because police
and internal security forces had long used such weapons as plastic bullets, bean-bag rounds, riot control
agents, water cannons, and batons. Law enforcement involvement and interest in NLWs seemed, however,
to pick up at the same time military forces began to look more seriously at deploying these weapon
technologies.
5
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Table 1. Leading NLW Technology Areas"

The debate about the implications of NLWs for international law unfolded in a
manner that heightened the debate's controversy. Generally speaking, the main
thrust of international law with respect to weapon technologies in the late nineteenth century and most of the twentieth century was to craft and apply rules
governing increasingly destructive and deadly weapons.12
"Non-lethal" weapons did not, however, fit into this pattern. As defined
by the US Department of Defense, NLWs are weapons "that are explicitly
11

Nicholas Lewer and Neil Davison, "Non-lethal technologies: An overview," DisarmamentForum, 2005,
pp. 37-51; Neil Davison and Nicholas Lewer, Bradford Non-Lethal Weapons Research Project Research
Report No. 7, May 2005; and Neil Davison and Nicholas Lewer, Bradford Non-Lethal Weapons Research
ProjectResearch Report No. 6, October 2004.
12 This is best exemplified by the problem nuclear weapons presented for IHL - a topic addressed in 1996
in an advisory opinion by the International Court of Justice. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, ICJReports, 1996, p. 226.
528
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designed and primarily employed so as to incapacitate personnel or material,
while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired
damage to property and the environment."' Defined in this way, "non-lethal"
weapons echoed IHL's objective of making armed conflict more humane. 4 In
addition, exploration of NLWs was driven to some degree by the constraints
IHL imposed on military forces engaging in non-traditional operations, such
as peacekeeping. This seeming convergence of interests created a context in
which military forces and international humanitarian lawyers and experts
could perhaps embrace these new weapon technologies together.
That embrace did not occur. "Non-lethal" weapon advocacy met with
scepticism from policy analysts, international lawyers, and those involved in
international humanitarian work." Many people wondered why such experts
were challenging more humane ways of warfare and peacekeeping. Although
simplistic, the question threatened to wrong-foot those not enthusiastic about
NLWs. Sceptics responded by pointing to the many unanswered questions for
which international law required answers before weapons could legitimately
be deployed.' 6 Nothing epitomized the distance separating advocates and
sceptics better than disagreements about the moniker "non-lethal weapons." 7
For proponents, this description encapsulated the technological and ethical
distinctiveness of these weapons. For sceptics, the moniker was misleading
because it gave moral status to weapons simply by virtue of their technology
and not on the basis of legal and ethical analysis of why, how and where they
are used.
This disagreement affected the international legal debate. Convinced
that NLWs were ethically distinct weapons, proponents questioned international legal rules that might restrict development and use of NLWs and broached
the need to consider changing such rules. A number of NLW advocates argued
13 Policy for Non-Lethal Weapons, US Department of Defense Directive No. 3000.3, para. C (9 July 1996).
See also NATO Policy on Non-Lethal Weapons, NATO, 13 October 1999, at <http://www.nato.int/docu/
pr/1999/p991013e.htm> (last visited 22 June 2005)("Non-Lethal Weapons are weapons which are explicitly
designed and developed to incapacitate or repel personnel, with a low probability of fatality or permanent
injury, or to disable equipment, with minimal undesired damage or impact on the environment").
14 Jonathan D. Moreno, "Medical ethics and non-lethal weapons:' American Journal of Bioethics, Vol. 4,
2004, p. WI (noting that "NLWs seem to advance one of Augustines requirements for just war: that only
as much force be used as necessary for the task.').

15 Well-known early critiques of NLWs include Malcolm Dando, A New Form of Warfare: The Rise of NonLethal Weapons, Brassey's, London, 1996; Nicholas Lewer and Steven Schofield, Non-Lethal Weapons: A
FatalAttraction?, Zed Books, London, 1997; and Robin Coupland, "'Non-lethal' weapons: Precipitating a
new arms race," British Medical Journal,Vol. 315, 1997, p. 72.
16 For example, 1977 Additional Protocol I requires States Parties to assess the legality of any new weapons,
means or methods ofwarfare. Additional Protocol (I) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977, UNTS, Vol. 1125,

p. 3, Art. 36. On this obligation, see Isabelle Daoust, Robin Coupland, and Rikke Ishoey, "New wars, new
weapons? The obligation of States to assess the legality of means and methods of warfare," International

Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 84, No. 846, June 2002, pp. 345-363; Justin McClelland, "The review of
weapons in accordance with Article 36 of Additional Protocol I' InternationalReview of the Red Cross,

Vol. 85, No. 850, June 2003, pp. 397-415.
17

For discussion of the term "non-lethal weapons:' see Brian Rappert, Non-Lethal Weapons as Legitimating
Forces? Technology, Politicsand the ManagementofConflict, Frank Cass, London, 2003, pp. 17-34.
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that treaties restricting their development should be amended." This position
highlighted the restrictions of the BWC and the CWC on development of "nonlethal" biological and chemical weapons.
But sometimes the proponents' views hinted at more radical ideas, such
as rethinking the moral framework that had historically guided international
law on armed conflict and replacing it with one that recognized new military
and ethical contexts made possible by NLW technologies." This radical
perspective can be sensed in the potential impact of "non-lethal" weapons on the
traditional international humanitarian law rule prohibiting the use of weapons
intentionally against civilian populations.20 Advocacy for NLWs raised the
question whether this prohibition was ethically sustainable, given the increasing
likelihood of armed conflict in urban areas. Would not the intentional use of
an NLW against mixed combatant and non-combatant populations create the
possibility of causing fewer civilian deaths and casualties than would result
from limiting military forces to "lethal" weapons in an environment where
making distinctions between combatants and non-combatants proves next to
impossible and militarily disadvantageous? 2 1
Convinced that "non-lethal" weapons were simply weapons without
any special ethical status, sceptics applied existing international law on arms
control, use of force, armed conflict, and human rights to argue that these
weapons generated many serious legal and ethical questions that should not
be obscured by "non-lethal" rhetoric. Moreover, sceptics insisted that development and use of NLWs must comply with existing, and future, international
law.22 Opposition was strongest when proponents argued that important international legal rules should be changed or rejected to make way for NLWs.
Alarm bells rang loudest with respect to "non-lethal" weapons that potentially
could undermine the BWC and CWC.23
Proponents and sceptics agreed, however, on one thing: the debate on
"non-lethal" weapons and international law was mainly about future technologies, not NLWs deployable in the latter half of the 1990s and early 2000s.
Although this debate covered plastic bullets, bean-bag rounds, entangling
nets, caltrops, sticky foam, riot control agents, flash-bang grenades, and simi18 In earlier writing, I referred to these arguments as the "selective change perspective." Fidler, op. cit. (note 3),
pp. 199-201.
19 In earlier writing, I called this position the "radical change perspective" Ibid., pp. 201-204.
20 Robin Coupland, "'Calmatives' and 'incapacitants': Questions for international humanitarian law brought
by new means and methods of warfare with new effects?," in Davison and Lewer 2004, op. cit. (note 11),
p. 35, p. 38 ("Another major concern in relation to 'non-lethal' weapons is that their proponents propose
they be used by soldiers against civilians when necessary.").
21 Jefferson D. Reynolds, "Collateral damage on the 21st century battlefield: Enemy exploitation of the law
of armed conflict, and the struggle for a moral high ground," Air Force Law Review, Vol. 56, 2005, p. 1,
pp. 99-100 ("Perhaps most promising of all are non-lethal weapons that can be applied against enemy
combatants commingled with civilians.').
22 In earlier writing, I called this the "compliance perspective." Fidler, op. cit. (note 3), pp. 198-199.
23 "Non-lethal' weapons, the CWC and the BWC," CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 61, September 2003, p. 1
(arguing that "as investment mounts in emergent 'non lethal weapons' (NLW) technologies, it becomes
increasingly urgent that the threat they pose to the CWC and BWC regime be recognised.").
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lar technologies, such low-tech NLWs were not the most important issue for
their proponents and sceptics. The existing generation had limited capabilities because they utilized mainly short-range mechanical, chemical or kinetic
technologies. The debate was really about what people called the "Buck Rogers
stuff," the next generation of NLWs that would harness higher-tech kinetic,
acoustical, electrical, electromagnetic, biological, chemical and other potential futuristic capabilities, such as nanotechnology.2 4
For this reason, advocates and sceptics were largely engaging in "crystal
ball" speculation in analysing how "non-lethal" weapons might affect armed
conflict. Advocates believed NLWs could make battlefields less lethal; sceptics cautioned that these weapons could act as force multipliers for "lethal"
weapons, making battlefields more, not less, deadly. From an international
legal perspective, such speculation differed depending on the "density" of the
international legal regime relevant to a given NLW technology. The most concentrated regimes banned both the development and use of certain technologies, such as the general prohibitions on biological and chemical weapons.
The less concentrated regimes did not specifically ban certain technologies but applied general rules to the development and use of weapons.
For example, no treaty directly regulates the development or use of a microwave weapon. However, IHL applies general disciplines to any use of a microwave weapon, including requirements that such use must distinguish between
combatants and non-combatants2 5 and must not cause superfluous injury or
unnecessary suffering to combatants.2 6 For want of either the new technologies or empirical data on their use, discourse about NLWs in the areas where
international legal regulation was less concentrated was the most speculative, often because the outcome of analysis depended on the actual intent and
behaviour of soldiers.
The "crystal ball" context had, however, two effects that put the proponents on the defensive. First, the case for developing the next generation
of technologies largely hinged on their "non-lethality." Without being able to
establish that a new technology was empirically "non-lethal,' the ethical force
for developing such a technology was weaker. Data on the human effects of
most current or proposed NLWs were non-existent, scant or not supportive
of a claim for "non-lethality." 27 Proponents had thus taken the debate down a

24 Center for Responsible Nanotechnology, Dangers of Molecular Manufacturing, at <http://www.crnano.org/
dangers.htm#arms> (last visited 22 June 2005), describing possible implications of nanotech weapons.
25 Jean-Marie Henckaerts, "Study on customary international humanitarian law: A contribution to the
understanding and respect for the rule of law in armed conflict," InternationalReview of the Red Cross,
Vol. 87, No. 857, March 2005, p. 175, p. 198 (stating that, under customary IHL, "[t]he parties to the
conflict must at all times distinguish between civilians and combatants. Attacks may only be directed
against combatants. Attacks must not be directed against civilians.").
26 Ibid., p. 204 (stating that, under customary IHL, "[t]he use of means and methods of warfare which are of
a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering is prohibited.").
27 Fidler, op. cit. (note 2), p. 62 (describing studies at the end of the 1990s which concluded that no existing
NLWs met criteria for qualifying as "non-lethal"). For more recent descriptions of health impact issues,
see Lewer and Davison, op. cit. (note 11), p. 48-49; Davison and Lewer 2005, op. cit. (note 11), p. 28.
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path that required them to establish the human effects of NLW technologies.
The ethical threshold they set imposed an empirical price on research and
development (R&D) that had yet to be paid. 28
The second effect also resulted from ethical claims advocates made. If
non-lethal weapons were ethically superior, some experts asked, then, ethically, do governments have an obligation to use these weapons first before
resorting to "lethal" force? Proponents countered this ethical argument with
a legal one: international law does not require the use of "non-lethal" force
before the use of "lethal" force in armed conflict. 29 Although correct in terms
of international law, the legal response did not answer the ethical question.
How could one advocate the development of ethically superior weapons and
not have an ethical obligation to use such weapons before "lethal" ones? To
be sure, this question leaves out much that would be ethically relevant to the
choice of weapons in armed conflict, but it brought potential ethical inconsistencies in NLW advocacy to light. Such ethical questions combined with
empirical uncertainty about the human effects of NLW technologies, created
difficulties for their proponents in the international legal debate.
The emergence of sustained debate about "non-lethal" weapons and
international law in the latter half of the 1990s revealed that neither side had
bested the other in the initial test of strength and that both were gearing up
for issues that would be raised by pursuit of more high-tech NLWs. Despite
increasing numbers of conferences, articles, books and reports, missing from
the debate was an event that would sharpen issues and expand political and
policy interest in the questions being examined by NLW proponents and
sceptics.
And then, in October 2002, Chechen terrorists took over a theatre in
Moscow.

During Moscow: The fog of fentanyl
The Chechen assault on the Nord-Ost Theatre in Moscow, and the crisis involving approximately 830 hostages, ended when Russian security forces pumped
an incapacitating chemical, believed to be a derivative of the opiate fentanyl,
into the theatre as a prelude to storming the building. Russian forces killed all
the terrorists and rescued hundreds of hostages. The fentanyl, however, killed
approximately 130 hostages - a fatality rate of 16%, more than twice the fatal28 Some NLW advocates have expressed frustration at the attention paid to the lack of empirical data on the
21
human effects of NLWs. See Davison and Lewer 2005, op. cit. (note 11), p.
(reporting on NLW advocate
John Alexander's dismissal of "concerns over insufficient data about the human effects of NLWs' ).
29 NATO, op. cit. (note 13): "Neither the existence, the presence nor the potential effect of Non-Lethal
Weapons shall constitute an obligation to use Non-Lethal Weapons, or impose a higher standard for,
or additional restrictions on, the use of lethal force." But see Davison and Lewer 2005, op. cit. (note 11),
p. 27 (describing NLW legal expert David Koplow arguing that the current state of international law
on this issue "was unlikely to 'hold' " and predicting "that in the future NLWs would indeed raise the
threshold for use of lethal force.').
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E

ity rate of "lethal" chemical weapons used on World War I battlefields.3 0 The
use of an incapacitating chemical to end the Moscow hostage crisis hit the
debate about NLWs and international law like a thunderbolt.
Russia's use of fentanyl had two immediate effects on that debate. The
first effect was to raise the profile of the controversy surrounding incapacitating
chemicals as potential NLWs. As explored below, what happened in Moscow
drew new attention to the way in which the CWC addressed the use of such
chemicals. Moscow made the CWC's relationship to incapacitating chemicals
more important both politically and legally, raising the stakes of this aspect of
the debate on NLWs and international law.
Second, the Moscow crisis produced what I call the "fog of fentanyl"
because the use of the incapacitating chemical gave both sides of the debate
material they could use, clouding rather than clarifying issues in the controversy.
For advocates, Moscow represented the kind of scenario that required thinking
more seriously about NLWs. The combination of incapacitating fentanyl and
conventional force saved most of the hostages, a result the use of conventional
force alone would not have produced. The ability to bring "non-lethal" and
"lethal" capabilities to bear appeared to save lives. Given the predictions about
the threat terrorism poses after 11 September 2001, what happened in Moscow
suggested to advocates that more vigorous pursuit of NLWs was needed with
respect to non-traditional law enforcement, security, and military threats.
But Moscow also provided sceptics with evidence to support their views.
The death toll from the fentanyl demonstrated that incapacitating chemicals
are not "non-lethal." Use of fentanyl in a context in which neither dosage nor
exposure environment could be controlled resulted in a significant fatality rate
among those exposed. These fatalities supported the sceptics' claims that NLWs
should be considered simply as weapons, the dangers of which depend on many
factors that must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis and not obscured by a
misleading, politically correct moniker.
Moscow intensified the sceptics' fears that interest in incapacitating
chemicals would increase, threatening the CWC. The manner in which Russian
security forces killed all the incapacitated terrorists reinforced international
humanitarian concerns about how NLWs might encourage military forces to
violate the IHL principle of 'hors de combat'.3 The fentanyl-related fatalities
among the hostages raised human rights questions about the Russian government's behaviour, particularly its lack of preparedness to deal with fentanylaffected persons in the aftermath of the theatre's storming.12
30 Alexander Kelle, "Science, technology and the CBW control regimes,' Disarmament Forum, 2005,
p. 8, p. 10. For a report on health problems suffered by the hostage survivors two years later, see Anna
Rudnitskaya, "Nord-Ost tragedy goes on' The Moscow News, Issue No. 41, 2004, at <http://english.mn.ru/
english/issue.php?2004-41-2> (last visited 22 June 2005).
31 Henckaerts, op. cit. (note 25), p. 203 (stating that, under customary IHL, "[a]ttacking persons who are
recognized as hors de combat is prohibited").
32 Independent Commission of Inquiry Must Investigate Raid on Moscow Theater: Inadequate Protection
for Consequences of Gas Violates Obligation to Protect Life, Human Rights Watch, 30 October 2002, at
<http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/10/russial030.htm> (last visited 20 June 2005).
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The "fog of fentanyl" meant that, dramatic as the Moscow incident was,
the use of the incapacitating chemical did not resolve the debate about NLWs
and international law. As the most significant real-world event involving an
NLW beyond traditional kinetic and mechanical devices and riot control agents,
the Moscow crisis heightened the debate's importance, especially with regard
to "non-lethal" chemical weapons. The next two sections look more closely
at the impact of the Moscow incident on the NLW-international law debate,
starting with the issue of the CWC's regulation of incapacitating chemicals and
then exploring the broader consequences of Moscow for the future relationship
between these weapons and international law.

After Moscow: Incapacitating chemicals and the CWC
The impact of Moscow on the CWC
The aspect of the debate about "non-lethal" weapons and international law that
has the longest history relates to "non-lethal" chemical weapons. The CWC
negotiations dealt with the controversy as to whether riot control agents could
be used as a method of warfare.33 In addition, CWC negotiators addressed the
use of toxic chemicals for purposes related to law enforcement. 4 The emergence
of interest in NLWs in the latter half of the 1990s led their advocates to argue
that CWC strictures on the military use of RCAs and incapacitating chemicals
ought to be revisited and perhaps changed,35 an argument colourfully captured
by one expert who asserted that "chemicals can be our friends. ' 6
The use of fentanyl during the Moscow crisis focused renewed attention
on the CWC's handling of incapacitating chemicals, especially Article II.9(d),
which allows the use of toxic chemicals for law enforcement purposes." This
law enforcement provision had caused concern during and after the CWC's
negotiation,38 but questions about its scope and potential impact on the CWC
lingered until the Moscow crisis, 9 which made such questions unavoidable
and significant in terms of the CWC and the broader debate concerning NLWs
33 Art. 1.5, CWC.
34 Ibid., Art. 11.9(d).
See, e.g. Nonlethal Technologies: Progress and Prospects, Independent Task Force, Council on Foreign
Relations, New York, 1999, at <http://www.cfr.org/pub3326/richardIgarwin- w winfield/nonlethal
technologies-progress-and-prospects.php#Report> (last visited 22 June 2005), arguing, in connection
with chemical and biological weapons, that US security might be enhanced by modifying treaties.
36 Russell Glenn, "Separating the wheat from the chaff: Non-lethal capabilities in future urban operations',
paper presented at Jane's 4th Annual Non-Lethal Weapons 2000 Conference, 5 December 2000.
37 Art. 11.9(d), CWC, which stipulates that" 'Purposes Not Prohibited Under this Convention' means: (...)
(d) Law enforcement including domestic riot control purposes.').
38 For example, an editorial in the Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin focused on the law enforcement
provision in Article 11.9(d) and asked "what is 'law enforcement'? ... Whose law? What law? Enforced
where? By whom?' "New weapon technologies and the loophole in the Convention," Chemical Weapons
35

Convention Bulletin, No. 23, March 1994, p. 1.
39 An editorial in the CBW Conventions Bulletin returned to the issue after the Moscow incident and asked
"what in the context of the Convention is 'law enforcement'?". "'Law enforcement' and the CWC," CBW
Conventions Bulletin, No. 58, December 2002, p. 1.
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and international law. Most experts agreed that what happened in Moscow fell
within the CWC's law enforcement provision, and this consensus added more
anxiety to controversies about how the provision should be interpreted. 40
The stakes with regard to the interpretation of the law enforcement pro-

vision were high for proponents and sceptics. For sceptics, the provision represented a potential loophole that proponents of incapacitating chemical weapons
could exploit to undermine the CWC's prohibition on the military anti-personnel
use of incapacitating chemicals.41 For advocates, the law enforcement provision
offered room to develop the potential of incapacitating chemicals and demonstrate their utility for both law enforcement purposes and missions the military
would face in twenty-first-century armed conflict. The provision was thus a
platform from which an argument could be built that the CWC's prohibition
on the military use of RCAs and incapacitating chemicals should be revised
to reflect new "non-lethal" capabilities in the chemical field. In this sense, the
law enforcement provision was a potential gateway to more robust "non-lethal"
chemical capabilities for law enforcement personnel and military forces.
How the law enforcement provision would be interpreted after Moscow
consequently became a policy and legal question of the highest order for the
debate on NLWs and international law, and this article now turns to the interpretation of that provision and the implications of that interpretation for the
future of this debate. 42

What toxic chemicals can be used for law enforcement purposes?
The initial interpretative question concerned the permissible range of toxic chemicals that can be used for law enforcement. Article II.9(d) clearly brings riot control agents within the range of permissible chemicals. 43 Some experts have claimed
that any toxic chemical used for law enforcement purposes has to have the same
properties as an RCA.4 4 This interpretation is wrong for four reasons.
40 Another factor enhancing the importance of the meaning of the CWC's law enforcement provision was
the convening in the spring of 2003, approximately six months after the Moscow incident, of the First
Review Conference of the CWC. When CWC States Parties failed at that Conference to address the issues
raised by the Moscow crisis, the controversy deepened.
41 The CWC does not prohibit the use of toxic chemicals for anti-matiriel purposes in contexts in which
the anti-mat6riel use of toxic chemicals does not adversely affect humans or animals. See Fidler, op. cit.
(note 2), p. 72.
42 The interpretation of the CWC's law enforcement provision in this article is based on the author's
previous analysis of this question, which was first presented to the open forum for non-governmental
organizations at the CWC's First Review Conference in May 2003 and then in revised form as
David P. Fidler, "Background paper on incapacitating chemical and biochemical weapons and law
enforcement under the Chemical Weapons Convention", 25 May 2005, prepared for a symposium on
incapacitating biochemical weapons in June 2005.
43 Art. 11.7, CWC, (defining an RCA as "[a]ny chemical not listed in a Schedule, which can produce rapidly
in humans sensory irritation or disabling physical effects which disappear within a short period of time
following termination of exposure").
44 Abraham Chayes and Matthew Meselson, "Proposed guidelines on the status of riot control agents and other
toxic chemicals under the Chemical Weapons Convention" Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin, No. 35,
March 1997, p. 13; Walter Krutzsch, "'Non-lethal' chemicals for law enforcement?" Berlin Information and
Center for Transatlantic Security Research Note 03.2, April 2003, p. 4.
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First, Article II.9(d) allows countries to use toxic chemicals for capital
punishment, and the chemicals used for this purpose are not RCAs.45
Second, treaty interpretation rules do not support restricting Article II.9(d)
to toxic chemicals that are RCAs. Under international law, a treaty must be interpreted "in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose."4 6
Article II.1(a) of the CWC states: "'Chemical Weapons' means the following, together or separately: (a) Toxic chemicals and their precursors, except
where intended for purposes not prohibited under this Convention, as long as
the types and quantities are consistent with such purposes." Thus, "toxic chemicals" are chemical weapons except where intended for purposes not prohibited
by the CWC, such as law enforcement. The law enforcement provision applies,
therefore, to "toxic chemicals" as defined in Article II.2,4 not just to riot control
agents as defined in Article II.7. Article 11.1(a) does not mention RCAs as a
limitation on the "toxic chemicals" that can be used for purposes not prohibited
under the CWC.
Third, riot control agents are defined as chemicals that are not listed on
any Schedule to the CWC.45 Toxic chemicals that can be used for purposes which
are not prohibited, including law enforcement, can be listed on Schedules 2 and 3
of the CWC. The CWC's Verification Annex makes this clear: a CWC State Party
may not produce, acquire, retain, or use Schedule I chemicals unless, among other
things, "[t]he chemicals are applied to research, medical, pharmaceutical or protective purposes."'49 Law enforcement is not listed as a purpose for which Schedule
1 chemicals may be produced, acquired, retained, or used. As Krutzsch and Trapp
observed, the Verification Annex relating to Schedule 1 chemicals is more restrictive than Article II.9, which means that "a Schedule 1 chemical cannot be used for
any other purposes than those listed even if such a purpose were a peaceful one
not related to the development, production or use of a chemical weapon.5 0
The Verification Annex on Schedule 1 chemicals thus means that CWC
States Parties cannot produce, acquire, retain, or use Schedule 1 chemicals for
law enforcement purposes. By contrast, the Verification Annex on Schedule 2
and 3 chemicals does not restrict in the same manner the purposes that are not
45 Some who have advocated restricting the range of toxic chemicals for law enforcement to those that meet
the RCA definition admit that lethal doses of toxic chemicals can be used in capital punishment. Chayes
and Meselson, op. cit. (note 44), p. 13 and Krutzsch, op. cit. (note 44).
46 Art. 31.1 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, UNTS, Vol. 1155, p. 331
(hereinafter Vienna Convention).
47 Article 11.2 of the CWC defines "toxic chemical" to mean: "Any chemical which through its chemical
action on life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or
animals. This includes all such chemicals, regardless of their origin or of their method of production,
and regardless of whether they are produced in facilities, in munitions or elsewhere. (For the purpose
of implementing this Convention, toxic chemicals which have been identified for the application of
verification measures are listed in Schedules contained in the Annex on Chemicals.)"
48 Art. II.7, CWC.
49 Ibid., Verification Annex, Part VI, A.2(a).
50 Walter Krutzsch and Ralf Trapp, A Commentary on the Chemical Weapons Convention, Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, The Hague, 1994, p. 418.
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prohibited, meaning that toxic chemicals listed on Schedules 2 or 3, which cannot be RCAs, may be employed for law enforcement purposes.
Fourth, in the Moscow incident the use of a toxic chemical that is not an
RCA for law enforcement purposes provides some evidence of State practice that the
CWC does not limit the range of chemicals that can be used under Article 11.9(d)
to RCAs. Under international law, subsequent State practice under a treaty can
be taken into account when interpreting a treaty." The State practice generated
by the Moscow incident comprises not only Russia's use of the toxic chemical
but also acquiescence of other CWC States Parties to such use. As Mark Wheelis
noted, "most analysts consider the Russian use of a fentanyl derivative to have
been legal" under Article 11.9(d). 52 Thus, international law on treaty interpretation indicates that the CWC does not limit the range of toxic chemicals that can
be used for law enforcement purposes to riot control agents.
CWC limitations on the development and use of toxic chemicals for law

enforcement purposes

Even though the CWC does not restrict law enforcement use of toxic chemicals
to RCAs, such use is subject to the requirement that the types and quantities
of chemicals developed, produced, acquired, stockpiled, retained, transferred,
or used must be consistent with such permitted purposes." These limitations
ensure that development, possession, and use of toxic chemicals for law enforcement do not undermine the CWC's prohibition on the development and use of
toxic chemicals for military purposes. As with other provisions of this treaty,
these disciplines must be interpreted in good faith to ascertain their ordinary
meaning in light of their context and of the treaty's object and purpose.
The "types and quantities" rule requires scrutiny ofthe relationship between
the chemical used and the law enforcement objective in question. The more difficult
it is to control the effects of a chemical in a law enforcement operation, the more
suspect such use is in terms of the agent being of a type or quantity consistent with
a law enforcement purpose. This interpretation resonates with concerns about the
deaths caused in Moscow by use of an incapacitating chemical.54
51 Art. 31.3(b), Vienna Convention.
52 Mark Wheelis, "Will the new biology lead to new weapons?" Arms Control Today, July/August 2004, p. 6,
p. 8. This analysis does not suggest that State practice from one incident can settle interpretative questions
raised by the CWC, but the State practice generated by the Moscow hostage situation is an important
instance of State practice under Article 11.9(d).
53 Art. II.1(a), CWC. Krutzsch and Trapp observed that "a State Party has not only to demonstrate that there
was a legitimate intent for the production or stockpiling of a certain chemical, but also that the chemical
is in fact of a type consistent with that purported intent, and that its quantity corresponds to the specified
purpose." Krutzsch and Trapp, op. cit. (note 50), p. 27.
54 "As with any chemical incapacitants, the concentration of fentanyl in any particular part of the building
will have been difficult to control, the effects of any given concentration of fentanyl on any particularly
susceptible individual would not have been known, and achievement of a certain separation between
the incapacitating and lethal effects of the drug in other words, discriminating between making people
unconscious without stopping them breathing is very difficult.' Malcolm Dando, "The danger to the
Chemical Weapons Convention from incapacitating chemicals, First CWC Review Conference Paper
No. 4, March 2003, p. 4.
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'

Extreme law enforcement situations
Use of incapacitating chemicals in contexts in which neither individual dosage nor
the exposure conditions can be controlled is thus legitimate only in extreme situations. Extreme law enforcement situations are those in which governments confront
the need to resort to potentially lethal force to resolve urgent, life-threatening situations because less violent and dangerous means of resolving the problems have
failed. The Moscow crisis qualified as an extreme law enforcement situation." In the
absence of such an extreme situation, a government is not using an incapacitating
chemical agent of a type, or in a quantity, consistent with law enforcement purposes
when it can control neither dosage nor exposure conditions.
International human rights law (IHRL), as a relevant body of international law under treaty interpretation rules,' 6 supports this conclusion. In
extreme law enforcement situations, governments contemplating use of incapacitating chemicals confront the obligation to protect the right to life." This
obligation prohibits governments from arbitrarily taking the lives of persons
subject to their jurisdictions," and IHRL does not permit any derogation from
this obligation, even in time of public emergency."
Human rights organizations have accused Russia of violating the right
to life by failing to provide adequate medical services to rescued hostages who
succumbed to the fentanyl gas. 6 0 The inability to control dosage or exposure
environment if incapacitating chemicals are used in extreme law enforcement
emergencies heightens a government's responsibility to ensure all precautions
are taken to minimize harm to innocent people and to provide immediate medical attention to those exposed and perhaps adversely affected.6
Law enforcement detention of individuals
This interpretation means that the "types and quantities" restraint on use of
incapacitating chemicals for non-extreme law enforcement situations requires
CWC States Parties to maintain strict control over dosage and exposure envi-

.

55 As Human Rights Watch commented on the Moscow hostage incident, "International law does not
prohibit the use of potentially lethal force in operations to liberate hostages, but it requires that such force
be 'absolutely necessary' and that all precautions be taken in both the planning and execution of such
operations to minimize the loss of civilian life.' Human Rights Watch, op. cit. (note 32).
56 Art. 31.3(c), Vienna Convention, ("There shall be taken into account, together with the context: ... (c)
any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties,').
57 Art. 3, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), UN Doc. A/810, 1948, p. 71
(hereinafter UDHR); Art. 6, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 19 Dec. 1966, UNTS,
Vol. 999, p. 171 (hereinafter ICCPR).
58 Human Rights Committee, "General Comment No. 6, Article 6," para. 3, in Compilation of General
Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, UN Doc. HRI/
GEN/1/Rev/1, 1994, p. 6.
59 Art. 4, ICCPR.
60 Human Rights Watch, op. cit. (note 32).
61 Commenting on the possible use of incapacitating chemicals for law enforcement purposes, the British
government argued: "The decision to use any drug whether intended to induce a state of calm or complete
unconsciousness requires knowledge ofa subject's medical history, particularly the use ofanyprescribed or nonprescribed medication and any relevant medical conditions. There would also be considerable responsibility in
terms ofimmediate and post-incident aftercare' Quoted in Lewer and Davison, op. cit. (note 11), p. 4 7
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ronment.6 2 Such control would mean that law enforcement authorities have
to have physical custody of the individual in question. In keeping with rules
on treaty interpretation, the "types and quantities" rule has to be interpreted
in light of relevant international law applicable between States.63 Thus, a law
enforcement situation involving physical custody of persons brings IHRL into
the analysis. 64 International law on civil and political rights directly addresses
law enforcement activities. 65 A reading of the "types and quantities" rule in light
of human rights law considerably limits the contexts in which law enforcement
authorities could use incapacitating chemicals against detained persons.
International human rights law prohibits torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment and permits no derogations from
this prohibition.6 6 Non-consensual, non-therapeutic use of an incapacitating
chemical against detained individuals would constitute degrading treatment
and could, depending on the severity of the chemical's physiological effects,
constitute cruel or inhuman treatment and perhaps even torture.6 7 States, international organizations and non-governmental human rights organizations have
long condemned the non-consensual, non-therapeutic use of psychotropic
drugs and other types of chemicals against detained persons. The only contexts
in which non-consensual, non-therapeutic use of an incapacitating chemical on
a detained person might be compatible with IHRL are situations in which the
detained person poses an immediate, violent threat to his or her own physical
safety (e.g. attempting suicide) or to safety and order in the detention facility
(e.g. attacking guards or participating in riots).
Thus, law enforcement purposes for which incapacitating chemicals may

be legitimately used on physically detainedpersons are extremely limited under
the CWC's "types and quantities" rule. Key to this interpretation is the relevance
of IHRL in determining the types and quantities of incapacitating chemicals
that can legitimately be used for law enforcement purposes connected to the
detention of individuals.

Summary: CWC limitations on development and use of toxic chemicalsfor law
enforcement
Overall, the "types and quantities" rule significantly restrains a CWC State
Party's ability to develop and use incapacitating chemicals for law enforcement
62 "To elicit the desired level ofmood alteration without causing a dangerous level of respiratory depression
(i.e. calming while maintaining consciousness) requires a tight control on dose level.' An Assessment
of Non-Lethal Weapons Science and Technology, Committee for an Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons
Science and Technology, National Academies Press, Washington, D.C., 2003, p. 27.
63 Art. 31.3(c), Vienna Convention.
64 The CWC was negotiated well after the development ofIHRL, which strengthens the legitimacy of making

reference to IHRL in the interpretation of the CWC's law enforcement provision.
65

See, e.g. Arts. 6 ICCPR (no arbitrary deprivation of life and rules on imposition of the death penalty),
7 (prohibition oftorture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment), 9-10 (rules relating to the
deprivation of liberty), and 14-15 (rules on charging and prosecuting individuals for criminal offences).

66 Art. 5 UDHR; Arts. 4.2 and 7 ICCPR.
67

Detailed analysis of these IHRL issues can be found in Fidler, op. cit. (note 42), pp. 33-44.
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purposes, whether those purposes involve groups of people or detained individuals. The legal "loophole" in Article II.9(d) is not, in fact, as dangerous as
some NLW sceptics feared. The CWC, informed by IHRL, sets serious limits
to a State's development and use of incapacitating chemicals for law enforcement purposes. Bringing IHRL to bear on the interpretation of the "types and
quantities" limitation conforms to the ethical objectives to which "non-lethal"
weapons proponents attribute their interest in incapacitating chemicals. NLW
proponents would be acting inconsistently from an ethical standpoint if they
rejected the application of human rights norms to the law enforcement use of
incapacitating chemicals. Thus, the positions of sceptics and proponents converge with respect to the interpretation of the "types and quantities" rule presented above.

The meaning of "law enforcement"
The second major question to arise in connection with the interpretation of
Article II.9(d) in the aftermath of Moscow was the scope of the term "law enforcement." Agreementthat Russia's use offentanylwas forlawenforcementpurposes gave
rise to concern and confusion about exactly how far "law enforcement" stretched
with respect to the use of incapacitating chemicals. As Dando asked, "when (...)
does law enforcement end and a method of warfare begin?"" The CWC does not
define "law enforcement:' which requires again engaging in treaty interpretation.
The basic question is whether "law enforcement" should be interpreted narrowly
or broadly."9 As discussed below, the choice also involves deciding whether
"law enforcement" includes activities relating to international law.
Enforcement of domestic law
What is meant by "law enforcement"? The ordinary meaning of "enforcement"
is to compel observance or obedience. 0 The ordinary meaning of "law" clearly
has the connotation of domestic law, or the law that applies to activities within
the territory, or subject to the jurisdiction, of a sovereign State. Article 11.9(d)
of the CWC is concerned, therefore, with the enforcement of domestic law.
Article 11.9(d) allows lethal doses of toxic chemicals to be used for capital punishment - a law enforcement function that takes place within a State's jurisdiction.
In addition, Article 11.9(d) allows toxic chemicals to be used for "[l]aw enforcement including domestic riot control purposes." The phrase "including domestic riot control" illustrates one kind of law enforcement activity permitted by
Article 11.9(d) and focuses attention on domestic law enforcement within a
68 Malcolm Dando, "Scientific and technological change and the future of the CWC: The problem of nonlethal weapons:' DisarmamentForum, 2002, pp. 33-34.
69 Krutzsch and Trapp spelled out this choice: "The phrase 'law enforcement including domestic riot
control' can be interpreted as meaning that there is riot control other than domestic riot control. On the
other hand, that 'non-domestic' riot control would have to be an internationally accepted means of 'law
enforcement"' Krutzsch and Trapp, op. cit. (note 50), p. 42 n. 45.
70 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary,Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993, p. 820.
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State's borders or jurisdiction." Russia's use of fentanyl occurred within its territory in response to violent, criminal acts. Although Article 11.9(d) covers the
enforcement of domestic law within a State's sovereign territory, two questions
linger: does Article II.9(d) support the use of toxic chemicals to enforce domestic law extrajurisdictionally, and to enforce international law?
Use of toxic chemicals in extrajurisdictionalenforcement of domestic law
To analyse whether Article II.9(d) allows the use of toxic chemicals in the extrajurisdictional enforcement of domestic law, the rules of international law on
this issue must be taken into account. It is clear from these rules that the CWC
does not authorize such use.
Under international law, a State may enforce a law only if it has jurisdiction to prescribe the law.7 2 The rules on prescriptive jurisdiction allow a State
to prescribe domestic law for persons, conduct, and activities beyond its jurisdictional boundaries. International law on jurisdiction to enforce law contains,
however, stricter limits: "It is universally recognized, as a corollary of state sovereignty, that officials of one state may not exercise their functions in the territory of another state without the latter's consent." 73 Two fundamental principles
support this position: (1) the principle of sovereignty and sovereign equality of
States; 74 and (2) the principle prohibiting intervention in the domestic affairs
of other States.7 ' Actions to enforce criminal law cannot be undertaken in the
jurisdiction of another State without that State's consent.
These rules mean that Article II.9(d) permits a State Party to use toxic
chemicals for law enforcement purposes only within areas subject to its jurisdiction. Under international law on enforcement jurisdiction, Article II.9(d) cannot be interpreted as allowing a State Party to use a toxic chemical to enforce its
domestic law inside areas subject to the jurisdiction of another State. Such use
would be legitimate only when (1) the CWC State Party with jurisdiction permits
toxic chemicals to be used; (2) the permission relates to a law enforcement purpose; and (3) the use complies with the "types and quantities" requirement.7 1
71 State practice indicates frequent use of RCAs by governments within their sovereign territories. See Davison
and Lewer 2004, op. cit. (note 11), pp. 34-35 (recording uses of RCAs around the world for crowd control).
72 American Law Institute, Restatement (Third) of the ForeignRelations Law of the United States, American
Law Institute Publishers, St. Paul, 1986, § 431(1). Under international law, a State has prescriptive
jurisdiction with respect to (1) conduct, persons, or activities wholly or in substantial part within its
territory or areas subject to its jurisdiction; (2) the activities, interests, status, or relations of its nationals
outside as well as within its territory and areas subject to its jurisdiction; and (3) conduct outside its
territory or areas subject to its jurisdiction (a) that has or is intended to have substantial effect within its
territory, and (b) by persons not its nationals that is directed against the security of the State or against
a limited class of other state interests. Ibid. § 402. Even with such a basis, the exercise of the jurisdiction
must also be reasonable. Ibid., § 403.

73 Ibid., p. 329.
74 Art. 2.1, UN Charter.
75 Ibid., Art. 2.7.
76 US State practice reflects this interpretation. The Commander's Handbook on the Law ofNaval Operations
lists as permissible the peacetime use of an RCA "[o]ff-base overseas for law enforcement purposes
specifically authorized by the host government." Steven F. Day, "Legal considerationsin noncombatant
evacuation operations," Naval Law Review, Vol. 40, 1992, p. 45, p. 60.
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The international legal rules on jurisdiction to enforce law demonstrate
that the ordinary meaning of "law enforcement" in Article II.9(d) incorporates
the enforcement of domestic law within the State's own territory or areas subject
to its jurisdiction. The ordinary meaning of "law enforcement" does not include
the extrajurisdictional enforcement of domestic law because such enforcement
depends entirely on the consent of another State.
Use of toxic chemicals to enforce internationallaw
Whether Article II.9(d) allows the use of toxic chemicals to enforce international law is another question that has arisen.7 7 Does the ordinary meaning of
"law enforcement" in light of the CWC's object and purpose include enforcement of international law?
To consider international law within the scope of "law enforcement"
in Article 11.9(d) would require an unconventional approach to the relationship between international law and enforcement. Whether international law is
enforceable is a perennial debate that makes inclusion of that law within the
ordinary meaning of "law enforcement" dubious. The decentralized and anarchic nature of international relations complicates its enforcement, hence the controversy: international law contains few centralized mechanisms under which
States can compel other States to obey it. As "Oppenheim's International Law"
noted, international law suffers deficiencies in the means available for enforcement of its rules.78 Thus, arguing that the ordinary meaning of "law enforcement" encompasses international law as well as domestic law lacks credibility,
given the general relationship between enforcement and international law.
Enforcement of international law is also subject to principles regulating
how States should handle disputes about violations of international law. Peaceful
settlement of disputes is a generally applicable principle,79 according to which
States must settle disputes without resort to force, violence and weaponry. States
can take peaceful countermeasures (e.g. economic sanctions) to try to compel
another State to comply with its international legal duties. Peaceful dispute settlement does not, however, contemplate use of toxic chemicals to compel obedience
to international law. In fact, nothing in international law justifies one State using
toxic chemicals to compel another State to comply with international law.
Law enforcement and the right to use force in self-defence
Some may argue that a CWC State Party can use toxic chemicals, pursuant to the
law enforcement provision, in the exercise of its inherent right of self-defence
against an armed attack or other form of illegal aggression by State or non-State
parties. In other words, a State's use of the toxic chemicals would form part of
the enforcement of international legal rules prohibiting the use of force. This
77 As Chayes and Meselson noted, the CWC "does not state explicitly what sources of law states may enforce
in invoking Article II.9(d). It seems possible, therefore, that states might wish to invoke international law
to justify their 'law enforcement' activities." Chayes and Meselson, op. cit. (note 44), p. 15.
78 Oppenheim's InternationalLaw, 9th ed., Longmans, London, 1992, p. 11.
79 Arts. 2.3, 2.4 and 33.1, UN Charter.
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argument lacks any support in international law. Self-defence is an inherent
right that States possess; it is not a "law enforcement" mechanism.8 0
Furthermore, the CWC's text, context, object and purpose point to the
goal of eliminating the use of toxic chemicals in armed conflict. Allowing toxic
chemicals to be used as part of the right of self-defence against aggression would
make the use of chemical weapons permissible in armed conflict - the very thing

the CWC prohibits. The same reasoningapplies to armed conflict conducted by

the armed forces of a State outside its jurisdiction, whether such operations

involve UN Security Council-authorized collective security responses, humanitarian intervention or anticipatory or pre-emptive self-defence.
Extraterritoriallaw enforcement activities undertaken by military forces and
permitted by internationallaw
Thus, Article 11.9(d) does not allow CWC States Parties to use toxic chemicals to
enforce international law. International law does, however, permit certain extraterritoriallaw enforcement activities by militaryforces in both traditional and non-traditional military operations. Such activities are within the scope of Article II.9(d).
International law recognizes a number of contexts in which military
forces engage in law enforcement activities in connection with traditional military
operations. These contexts generally relate to the preservation of public order and
safety in areas subject to the control of military forces. First, IHL acknowledges
the responsibility of the occupying power "to maintain the orderly government of
the territory." The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) observed
that this provision empowers the occupying power "in its capacity as the Power
responsible for public law and order." 8 2 Fulfilment of this responsibility for public
order and safety would include activities such as controlling civilian crowds in
order to prevent disorder in the occupied territory.
Second, IHL also allows occupying forces to ensure the security of their
members and property, of the occupying administration, and of the establishments and lines of communication used by them. 83 This right gives occupying
forces international legal permission to enact and implement penal legislation
in order to protect their soldiers, administrators, buildings, lines of communication, equipment and other forms of property from problems created or threats
posed by non-combatants in the occupied territory."
80 Ibid., Art. 51.
81 Art. 64, Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
12 August 1949, UNTS, Vol. 75, p. 287 (hereinafter GC IV).
82 Commentary on Geneva ConventionIV Relative to the Protectionof Civilian Persons in Time ofWar, ICRC,
Geneva, 1958, p. 337.
83 Art. 64, GC IV.
84 An example of the use of an RCA to protect the occupying power's property is described in a report on
"non-lethal" weapons sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations. In response to civilians infiltrating
a military base in Baghdad occupied by US military forces and attempting to loot property, US military
personnel used various "non-lethal" weapons, including a RCA, oleoresin capsicum (OC), to clear the
civilians from the compound. Independent Task Force, Non-Lethal Weapons and Capabilities,Washington,
D.C., Council on Foreign Relations, 2004, p. 51. See also Davison and Lewer 2005, op. cit. (note 11),
pp. 22-24 (describing use of various NLWs in US military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan).
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Third, IHL recognizes that as well as the laws of the occupied territory, the occupying power may enforce laws it promulgates itself pursuant to its
responsibilities under the international law of occupation."5 Such powers would
include law enforcement techniques and weapons, such as RCAs, used to control civilian crowds and to protect public order and safety.
Fourth, IHL allows military forces to regulate the behaviour of prisoners
of war (POWs).1 6 Military forces can enforce laws, regulations and orders against
POWs" and may use weapons against POWs in extreme circumstances, such as
attempts to escape" after prior warnings appropriate to the circumstances are
disregarded. According to the ICRC, the detaining power may use force against
POWs engaged in rebellious or mutinous behaviour: "Before resorting to weapons of war, sentries can use others which do not cause fatal injury and may even
be considered as warnings - tear gas, truncheons, etc." 9
These four contexts in which international law recognizes the legitimacy of extraterritorial law enforcement activities by military forces indicate
that Article II.9(d) of the CWC includes these activities. This interpretation
covers some of the circumstances in which the United States claims the ability
to use RCAs in military situations, namely: (1) in areas under direct and distinct
US military control, including the control of rioting POWs; and (2) in rear
echelon areas outside the zone of immediate combat to secure convoys from
civil disturbances.9 0
The above analysis also applies to non-traditional military activities,
such as peacekeeping operations, recognized as legitimate under international
law. Non-traditional military operations have legitimacy under international
law if they are conducted pursuant to: (1) a request for peacekeeping forces
from a sovereign State; and (2) the authorization of peacekeeping operations by
the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
Military forces conducting peacekeeping operations will often find
themselves responsible for the security of, and public order and safety within,
civilian populations; will be involved in law enforcement operations (e.g.
arresting suspected war criminals, rescuing hostages); and will face threats
to the security of their personnel and equipment from non-combatants."
Indeed, the challenges military forces face in handling civilian populations

85 GC IV, Arts. 64-78.
86 Arts. 41, 82, Third Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949,
UNTS, Vol. 75, p. 135 (hereinafter GC III).
87 Ibid., Art. 82.
88 Ibid., Art. 42.
89 Commentary on Geneva Convention III Relative to the Treatment ofPrisonersof War, ICRC, Geneva, 1960,
p. 247.
90 Executive Order 11850, FederalRegister, Vol. 40, 1975, p. 161, paras. (a), (d)).
91 After being unable to prevent violent mobs from attacking monasteries in Kosovo in March 2004,
Germany announced its intention to equip its peacekeepers with RCAs. Davison and Lewer 2004, op. cit.
(note 11), p. 34. In the Ivory Coast, French military forces used RCAs against rioting civilians in the wake
of the French military intervention that followed an attack on French peacekeepers by the country's air
force. Davison and Lewer 2005, op. cit. (note 11), p. 53.
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during peacekeeping operations have partly fuelled military interest in "nonlethal" weapons in the last decade. 92
Thus, the CWC permits the use by military forces of RCAs for law
enforcement purposes during non-traditional military operations sanctioned
by international law. This interpretation is consistent with US claims that its
military forces may lawfully use RCAs in (1) the conduct of peacetime military
operations within an area of ongoing armed conflict when the United States
is not a party to the conflict; (2) peacekeeping operations authorized by the
receiving State, including peacekeeping operations pursuant to Chapter VI of
the UN Charter; and (3) peacekeeping operations where force is authorized by
the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter."
This interpretation does not, however, support the US position
that it may use RCAs against combatant forces in the above-listed nontraditional military operations.9 4 The types of law enforcement activities that
international law allows military forces to undertake in traditional and nontraditional military operations relate to the interaction of military troops and
non-combatants, in the form of either POWs or civilians, not the engagement
of combatant forces.
The interpretation of Article II.9(d) as presented above has two implications that deserve mention. First, it means that in extreme law enforcement
situations, military forces conducting extraterritorial law enforcement activities permitted by international law during traditional and non-traditional
military operations might not be limited to the use of riot control agents.
State practice suggests, however, that the CWC is more restrictive with regard
to the use by military forces of toxic chemicals in such activities. Moreover,
CWC States Parties, including the United States, have never claimed the ability to use, or actually used, toxic chemicals other than RCAs for the types of
law enforcement activities permitted by international law in traditional and
non-traditional military operations. 95 , 96 This more restrictive interpretation
has two sources: (1) those activities are extraterritorial and do not benefit
from the discretion accorded by international law to governments within their
own territories; and (2) they are undertaken by military forces. The CWC's
92 Fidler, op. cit. (note 2), p. 58.
93 US Senate Executive Resolution No. 75 - Relative to the Chemical Weapons Convention, Congressional
Record, Vol. 143, p. S3373-01, 17 April 1997, § 26A.
94 Ibid.
95 President Bush authorized US military forces to use RCAs in Iraq in 2003 under the circumstances
described in Executive Order 11850. Neil Davison and Nicholas Lewer, Bradford Non-Lethal Weapons
Research Project Report No. 4, 2003, p. 13. The UK military indicated in March 2003 that it would use
RCAs in Iraq solely for riot control purposes. Davison and Lewer 2004, op. cit. (note 11), p. 34.
96 This situation has produced incentives for trying to fit new chemical compounds, such as malodorants,
within the definition of an RCA, as the United States has done. Davison and Lewer 2003, op. cit.
(note 95), p. 10. Such an approach will not, however, work for stronger incapacitating chemicals. As
a National Research Council report observed, "[t]he use of calmatives had (...) been envisioned in
connection with hostage situations and for use with 'unmanageable' prisoners, but not for riot situations
in which incapacitated individuals might be trampled or crushed in the rioting." Committee for an
Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons Science and Technology, op. cit. (note 62), p. 27.
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object and purpose means that heightened scrutiny, and extra safeguards, are
appropriate when extraterritorial military activities involving toxic chemicals
are at issue.
The second implication of the above interpretation of Article II.9(d)
is that it covers many, but not all, of the uses of riot control agents which the
United States claims are legal under the CWC. It does not cover two situations
in which the United States believes that the use of RCAs is legally permissible:
(1) contexts in which civilians are used to mask or screen attacks and civilian
casualties can be reduced or avoided; and (2) rescue missions in remote areas of
downed aircrew and passengers, and of escaping POWs." Neither of these situations resembles those in which military forces may engage in the kinds of law
enforcement activities sanctioned by international law.
The use of riot control agents against enemy combatants attempting to
capture downed aircrew and passengers or escaping POWs, or against enemy
combatants who are employing civilians as human shields or to mask attacks, is
more akin to a method of warfare than to a law enforcement purpose. Neither
of these uses fits in with the kinds of law enforcement activities that are
undertaken by military forces and sanctioned by international law. Interpreting
Article II.9(d) in this manner is consistent with treaty interpretation principles
because it distinguishes between law enforcement purposes permitted by
Article II.9(d) and methods of warfare prohibited by Article 1.5.
Law enforcement and combating insurgencies
Counter-insurgency operations in Iraq have raised the question whether
military forces can use RCAs or incapacitating chemicals in counterinsurgency activities. In other words, can counter-insurgency operations
mounted by military forces be considered a law enforcement purpose under
Article II.9(d)? The insurgency context poses conceptual problems because
it falls between traditional notions of armed conflict between States and law
enforcement within a State. Environments involving insurgencies and largescale, organized civil violence have presented IHL with difficulties in the
past, as evidenced by the controversies that surrounded the negotiation of
Additional Protocol II on non-international armed conflict. It is therefore not
surprising that the insurgency context creates problems for the interpretation
of Article II.9(d).
International humanitarian law rules on non-international armed conflict apply to conflicts in the territory of a State between its armed forces and
dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which exercise such
control over a part of that State's territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations." This threshold provides a demarcation point between armed conflict and law enforcement within a State. Thus,
97 Executive Order 11850, op. cit. (note 90), § (b)-(c).
98 Art. 1, Protocol (II) Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the

Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 10 June 1977, UNTS, Vol. 1125, p. 609.
546

Volume 87 Number 859 September 2005

Additional Protocol II is a relevant source of applicable rules that should inform
interpretation of Article II.9(d).
Military action taken against insurgents who exercise control over part
of a State's territory and carry out sustained and concerted military operations
constitutes armed conflict rather than law enforcement, and thus falls outside
Article II.9(d). The CWC's prohibition of the use of chemical weapons "under
any circumstance"" encompasses civil conflict as well as international conflict.
This reasoning also suggests that use of RCAs in counter-insurgency operations
would be a method of warfare prohibited by Article 1.5 of the CWC. The State
practice of military forces in Iraq to date supports this interpretation, because
such forces have not used RCAs or incapacitating chemicals in counter-insurgency operations.

Moscow, law enforcement and the CWC
The foregoing detailed analysis of the CWC's law enforcement provision is
made in response to the shock waves that the use of fentanyl to end the Moscow
hostage crisis sent through the debate on NLWs and international law. Most
experts agreed that Russia's use of fentanyl fell within Article II.9(d), but uncertainty and worries about this provision's meaning and application with respect
to contexts beyond the scenario in Moscow urgently needed to be resolved. The
interpretation of Article II.9(d) presented above answers many questions raised
about this provision and addresses fears that Moscow demonstrated it to be, as
some had previously argued, "a grave weakness" making the CWC vulnerable to
"advancing science and technology." 0 Admittedly, the law enforcement provision is complex, but analysis in the wake of Moscow indicates that it does not
prostrate the CWC's object and purpose before benign or malevolent manipulation of advances in science and technology. Clarification of the provision is an
important development after Moscow, but, as the next section argues, the impact
of Moscow on the debate about NLWs and international law goes beyond determining the meaning of the law enforcement provision in the CWC.

Beyond Moscow: Non-lethal weapons and international law today and
tomorrow
Chemical and biological NLWs and international law: A sea change?
Looking beyond the impact of the Moscow crisis on the interpretation of the CWC,
a shift can be detected among important opinion leaders in the United States with
regard to the prudence of pursuing chemical or biological NLW capabilities. This
shift can be perceived in two reports by NLW task forces sponsored by the influential

99 Art. 1.1, CWC.
100 "New weapon technologies and the loophole in the Convention,' op. cit. (note 38), p. 2.
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Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), one issued before the Moscow incident and
one after. In 1999, a CFR task force discussing chemical and biological capabilities
argued that "[o]n occasion, U.S. security might be improved by a modification
to a treaty,"o' which suggested a willingness on the part of opinion leaders in the
United States to consider amending the CWC and/or the BWC.
Another CFR task force on non-lethal weapons reached, however, the
opposite conclusion in 2004. This task force "considered the benefits that would
accrue and the problems that would be posed by either a U.S. attempt to interpret the CWC or by a U.S. move to amend or to renounce the CWC in order to
be able to use chemicals as nonlethal weapons against enemy combatants."1 o 2
This analysis led the task force to conclude:
"The Task Force believes that to press for an amendment to the CWC or
even to assert a right to use RCAs as a method of warfare risks impairing the
legitimacy of all NLW. This would also free others to openly and legitimately
conduct focused governmental R&D [research and development] that could
more readily yield advanced lethal agents than improved nonlethal capabilities. (...) Accordingly, the Task Force judges that on balance the best course
for the United States is to reaffirm its commitment to the CWC and the BWC
and to be a leader in ensuring that other nations comply with the treaties."1 3
The shift from the 1999 report to the conclusion reached by the 2004
report indicates a growth in awareness that loosening the strictures of the
CWC or the BWC for "non-lethal" weapons purposes would not only harm US
national security by providing incentives for others to pursue research easily
exploited for lethal purposes but also - in the words of the 2004 CFR task
force - damage the legitimacy of all NLWs. The 2004 CFR task force supported
development of more NLW capabilities1 04 but concluded that keeping chemical
or biological options open would undermine progress toward that goal. This
task force wanted to avoid the deleterious policy and legal effects of the "fog of
fentanyl" as part of the larger movement for more NLW development.
Other indications, too, support the conclusion that prospects and enthusiasm for more robust chemical capabilities are diminishing. Legal expert David
Koplow has argued that amending the CWC to allow military use of "non-lethal"
chemical weapons, whether RCAs or incapacitating chemicals, exists only in
the realm of fantasy.' A lawyer with the US Judge Advocate General admitted
that the CWC prohibited military use of calmative chemical agents, calling into
question the legality of any military interest in such incapacitating weapons.'06

101 Independent Task Force 1999, op. cit. (note 35).
102 Independent Task Force 2004, op. cit. (note 84), p. 31.
103 Ibid., p. 32.
104 Ibid., p. 1.
105 Davison and Lewer 2005, op. cit. (note 11), p. 26 (reporting comments of NLW legal expert David Koplow
at the Non-Lethal Defense Conference VI in March 2005).
106 Ibid. (reporting a lawyer from the US Judge Advocate General as arguing that it was "more likely than not
that the Chemical Weapons Convention prohibited these types [calmatives] of weapons systems').
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The change in position of CFR task forces does not mean that
interest in, or controversy about, chemical and biological NLWs for military
purposes has evaporated. Some advocates continue to push for chemical
and biological NLWs, which would require changing international law.'
Moreover, indications exist that military interest in incapacitating chemicals
continues.'o A NATO report mentioned anti-materiel biological weapons as
a technology of interest,0 9 despite the BWC's prohibition of such weapons"0
and a prior NATO report that concluded that anti-matdriel biological weapons
were not permitted under the BWC.' Arguments are being put forward that
the CWC does not regulate malodorants, meaning that military forces could
use them in armed conflict." 2 Misgivings have been expressed that newer
incapacitating chemicals will be called RCAs to provide cover for research
and development under the guise of law enforcement purposes."' In addition,
concern is growing about so-called incapacitating "biochemical" weapons
involving substances that might be classified as toxins under the BWC and/
or as toxic chemicals under the CWC." 4 All these observations mean that
international legal vigilance on NLW chemical, biological, and biochemical
weapons remains important.
Nevertheless, the shift evident among CFR opinion leaders, combined
with the sustained arguments and efforts of NLW sceptics, indicates that some
"sea change" has occurred with regard to chemical and biological weapons in the

.

107 Davison and Lewer 2005, op. cit. (note 11), p. 21 (reporting that, at the Non-Lethal Defense Conference VI in March 2005, NLW advocate John Alexander held that "the issue of chemical and biological
weapons should be revisited for non-lethal weapons purposes arguing that international law prohibiting
their development is 'out-dated."').
108 Dando, op. cit. (note 54), p. 17. One non-governmental organization has accused the United States
of operating a secret chemical weapons programme in violation of the CWC. "US military operates
secret chemical weapons program, Sunshine Project Aerogramme, No. 2002/05, Sunshine Project,
24 September 2002.
109 NATO Research and Technology Organization, Non-lethal weapons and future peace enforcement
operations,TR-SAS-040, November 2004, p. 3-6.
110 See, e.g., PreliminaryLegal Review ofProposedChemical-BasedNonlethal Weapons, US Department of the
Navy Office of the Judge Advocate General, 30 Nov. 1997, p. 21 ("The Biological Weapons Convention
and, more clearly, the domestic [US] implementing legislation, prohibit the development, production,
stockpiling of biological agents for use as weapons. Biological agents are broadly defined by the statute so
as to include agents used for anti-material purposes.').
111 See Committees of the North Atlantic Assembly, Non-lethal weapons, Lord Lyell (United Kingdom)
General Rapporteur, 18 April 1997, Doc. No. STC (97)3, at § 39 (stating that "the use of biological agents
to render fuels inert or destroy materials used in material equipment would not be permissible under the
BWC even if the intent was non-lethal.").
112 Massimo Annati, "Military use of chemical riot control agents: A case for legal assessment', paper
presented to the 3rd European Symposium on Non-Lethal Weapons, 10-12 May 2005, Ettlingen,
Germany, p. 7 (arguing that malodorants are not toxic chemicals under the CWC); Jared Silberman,
"Non-lethal weaponry and non-proliferation," Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics and Public Policy,
Vol. 19,2005, pp. 347-348 (US Navy lawyer arguing that "[o]ne thing that you may see on the horizon is
the use of malodorants - a way to deny access to an enemy").
26
113 Davison and Lewer 2005, op. cit. (note 11), p.
114 Neil Davison, "Weapons focus: Biochemical weapons," in Bradford Non-Lethal Weapons Research Project
Report No. 5, May 2004, pp. 27-34; Wheelis, op. cit. (note 52), pp. 6-13; Malcolm Dando, "The malign
use of neuroscience," DisarmamentForum, 2005, pp. 17-24; Kathryn Nixdorff, "Assault on the immune
system,' DisarmamentForum, 2005, pp. 25-35.
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debate about NLWs and international law after the Moscow crisis. Whether this
sea change proves permanent or ephemeral bears watching in the next decade.

The path less regulated: Other NLW technologies and international law
As the Moscow crisis demonstrated and the latest CFR task force recognized,
the chemical and biological paths to "non-lethal" weapons are fraught with
intense controversy, much of which is connected to the "concentrated" manner
in which international law regulates chemical and biological weapons. Other
NLW technologies do not face the international legal scrutiny applied to chemical or biological agents. Nothing like the CWC or BWC exists for kinetic, acoustic, electrical, microwave and electromagnetic "non-lethal" weapon technologies; this creates a more conducive environment for research and development.
The IHL and IHRL rules that apply are general in nature (e.g. no superfluous
injury or unnecessary suffering from a weapon's use; no torture or other cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment) rather than specific to a technology. This
situation facilitates technologies moving from research and development to
deployment. Although concerns about some of these technologies do exist, as
illustrated by controversies surrounding Taser weapons,"' nothing like the "fog
of fentanyl" currently complicates exploration of these NLW possibilities.
Interestingly, some "non-lethal" weapon advocacy seeks to prevent further density from developing in international legal regulation of these technologies. In November 2004, NATO's Research and Technology Organization
(RTO) recommended that, "[i]n order to ensure that NATO forces retain the
ability to accomplish missions, NATO nations must remain vigilant against the
development of specific legal regimes which unnecessarily limit the ability to
use NLW.""6 The RTO demonstrated no overt hostility to international law's
role vis-h-vis NLWs, for it emphasized the duty of NATO countries to review
the legality of new weapons and the need to determine whether IHL adequately
addresses the use of "non-lethal" weapons."' The desire to prevent further
development of specific international legal regulation hints, however, at a concern that the debate on NLWs and international law has created momentum for,
or at least serious interest in, international legal regulation of NLW technologies
that threatens future military adoption and use of such technologies.
This recommendation underscores, however, a message of sceptics: there
is no such thing as a "non-lethal" weapon. The RTO essentially wants the existing
rules that apply to any new weapon to apply to NLWs. In other words, treat
"non-lethal" weapons as simply weapons under existing rules. Sceptics have been
arguing this position all along. The Moscow crisis also supports the argument that
thinking of weapons as "lethal" or "non-lethal" is empirically and ethically suspect.

115 See Davison and Lewer 2005, op. cit. (note 11), pp. 34-41 (reviewing controversies surrounding the Taser
weapon).
116 NATO Research and Technology Organization, op. cit. (note 109), p. iii.

117 Ibid., pp. 4-5.
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At the same time, the RTO's opposition to specific regulation of NLW
technologies undercuts arguments put forward by advocates about why "nonlethal" weapons are ethically different. If a new technology requires, for humanitarian or other ethical reasons, additional rules on its development or use, then
the ethically appropriate course of action would be new regulation of military
development and use of that technology."' Arguments that NLWs are ethically
distinct rely on the ethics of existing IHL and IHRL as the moral baseline, which

makes advocacy for no more specific regulation of new weapon technologies to
enhance the military effectiveness of weapons ethically questionable.
In fairness to the RTO, it must be said that the recommendation opposed
specific international legal regulations that "unnecessarily" limit military use of
NLWs. But this qualifier begs the question as to what constitutes a necessary
or unnecessary limit on the militarily effective use of a weapon. The fallout
from the Moscow crisis, including the interpretation of the CWC's law enforcement provision, illustrates the value of specific international legal regulation of
weapon technologies. The tension between the lessons from Moscow and the
desire by some advocates to prevent further international legal regulation of
NLW technologies is merely another manifestation of the old tension between
military utility (defined by technology) and ethical principle (embodied in
humanitarian law), a tension that IHL has been addressing since at least the late
nineteenth century. The future of the debate about NLWs and international law
will deeply involve both advocates and sceptics in grappling with this ancient
tension against the backdrop of technological developments that promise to
reshape the nature and art of war.

Conclusion
Davison and Lewer reported that, at a major "non-lethal" weapon conference
in March 2005, advocates complained that they were losing the "public relations battle" over NLWs because of criticism from sceptics and the media."'
Frustration was evident that the critics and the media "just don't get it" 12 0
Apparently, the critics and the media are not the only ones not "getting it." In
2004, the CFR task force on "non-lethal" weapons concluded that it "found little
evidence that the value and transformational applications of nonlethal weapons
are appreciated by the senior leadership of the Department of Defense. Despite
success on the small scale, NLW have not entered the mainstream of defence
thinking and procurement."1 21
The disappointment of advocates with their lack of progress reflects
the difficult environment shaped by many factors, including what happened in
118 The classic example of this dynamic is the development of the prohibition on the use of blinding laser
weapons.
119 Davison and Lewer 2005, op. cit. (note 11), p. 21.

120 Ibid.
121 Independent Task Force 2004, op. cit. (note 84), p. 8.
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Moscow in October 2002. The meaning of Moscow was sobering to advocates
and sceptics, requiring each side to revisit assumptions and arguments in order
to gird for a difficult and complex future, particularly with regard to the role of
international law. The "fog of fentanyl" presented both advocates and sceptics
with a harsh reality that changed the context in which the future of "non-lethal"
weapons would unfold.
The frustration of advocates at losing the public relations battle has
deeper causes than a failure to market NLWs successfully. Many military leaders
obviously remain sceptical of the utility of these weapons. Furthermore, as
Moscow demonstrated, hard questions have to be asked of claims that weapons
are "non-lethal" and are somehow ethically distinct because of their technology
as opposed to their relationship with legal and ethical principles of behaviour.
The arguments advocates used in the latter half of the 1990s to increase interest
in "non-lethal" weapons no longer have the same traction in the current, more
demanding environment. Some arguments, such as the ones advocating amendments to the CWC or BWC, have gone - even within the advocacy community
- from being considered intellectually provocative to downright dangerous to
the development of other technologies.
The meaning of Moscow also challenges sceptics. As analysed in detail
in this article, the response to the terrorist attack at the Nord-Ost theatre forced
more serious consideration of the law enforcement provision of the CWC, the
importance of which that response made all too clear. Furthermore, continuing
interest in many non-chemical and non-biological NLW technologies means
that the debate about "non-lethal" weapons and international law will continue
for years, but with respect to technologies the development and use of which are
not subject to arms control treaties. Post-Moscow, the next big test will come
when technological breakthroughs in more advanced kinetic, electrical, acoustic, microwave or electromagnetic technologies occur and field deployment and
use generates empirical data.122
What happened with respect to Moscow - recognition of space for "nonlethal" weapon use balanced by a need to apply, clarify and reinforce the parameters provided by international law - will characterize the NLW-international
law relationship in the future as more advanced technologies mature. In short,
the meaning of Moscow teaches that rapid technological change will continue
to stress international law on the development and use of weaponry, but in ways
more politically charged, legally complicated and ethically challenging than the
application of international humanitarian law in the past to technologies specifically designed to kill and destroy.

122 See Steven Komarow, "Pentagon deploys array of non-lethal weapons, USA Today, 24 July 2005, at <http://
www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2005-07-24-nonlethal-weapons~x.htm>
(last visited 27 July 2005).
At present, the pace at which such breakthroughs might happen is being slowed by a lack of funding. In the
United States, commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan adversely affect prospects for Department of Defense
support for development of NLW technologies. The research and development burden will fall, therefore, on
the private sector. See Davison and Lewer 2005, op. cit. (note 11), p. 22.
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